This past April the IDF published its new military doctrine. The new classified
field manual, The General Staff's Operational Concept for the IDF, is the
result of four years of serious study. It gives expression to the transformative
changes the IDF's way of thinking about war fighting and designing military
campaigns underwent since the outbreak of the Palestinian terror war in September
2000.
Yet last week the IDF separated itself from those most responsible for leading
its intellectual transformation. On May 30, the heads of the IDF's Operational
Theory Research Institute (OTRI), Brig. Gen. (res.) Dov Tamari and Brig.
Gen. (res.) Dr. Shimon Naveh, were notified that they were suspended from
their duties due to irregularities in their billing procedures. On Tuesday
a distorted version of the events was presented to the public on the front
page of Yediot Ahronot. The headline read, "Hero of Israel Suspended from
Duties: Brig. Gen. (res.) Dov Tamari, commander of the Operational Theory
Research Institute, who received three combat decorations, is suspected of
[financial] irregularities."
Tamari and Naveh's suspensions together with Tuesday's headlines effectively
terminated one of the most glorious periods in the IDF's intellectual history.
It ended a process that OTRI shepherded which, over the past decade, has
transformed the IDF into the world leader in operational warfare.
The story of OTRI's disembowelment should alarm anyone who cares about the
IDF. It is part and parcel, and indeed an exacerbation of the trend that
has been forcing independent thinkers out of decision-making circles in Israel
for the past three years. In 2003 this trend was ushered in when, after
consulting with his public relations team, then-prime minister Ariel Sharon
decided to retreat from Gaza in exchange for absolutely nothing.
Sharon made this decision without advising with the IDF General Staff. For
his opposition to the plan, then IDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Moshe
Yaalon was fired. So too, Efraim Halevy, former Mossad director, was forced
out of his position as director of the National Security Council for his
opposition to Sharon's sole reliance on his PR flacks Reuven Adler, Dov Weisglass
and Eyal Arad in making strategic decisions about Israel's future. This trend
most recently caused the conclusion of Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland's tenure
as Halevy's successor at the National Security Council. Eiland made clear
his complete opposition to the retreat strategies adopted by the Sharon and
Olmert governments in an interview with Ha'aretz this past Sunday. Eiland's
comments - like all statements by national leaders expressing opposition
to the retreat strategy before them - were completely ignored by the rest
of the Israeli media.
SINCE THE summer of 2004, I have been employed as a researcher at OTRI. Naveh's
decision to offer me the position two years ago came as a complete surprise.
An ideological gulf separates me from Naveh, Tamari and most of OTRI's
researchers. Yet, as I became familiar with OTRI's work, I realized it is
wholly non-ideological. OTRI concerns itself solely with the pursuit and
development of knowledge necessary for military commanders to think critically,
systemically and methodologically about war fighting. In promulgating its
operational concepts, OTRI pays little attention to who the enemy is or how
to fight a specific group of people - Palestinian, Iraqi, Russian, American,
Israeli, etc.
Rather, the institute's work focuses on the concept of "enemy" and provides
operational commanders with tools to conceptualize both their enemies and
themselves for the purpose of designing suitable campaigns. In short, OTRI's
methods are a powerful tool - like a tank - that can serve anyone who understands
how to use them, without connection to his identity or that of his enemy.
In light of this, the decision to get rid of Tamari and Naveh is even more
disconcerting than Sharon and Olmert's decision to force Yaalon, Halevy and
Eiland from their posts. In those cases, the political leaders purged the
ranks of decision-makers of those who oppose their political goals. In so
doing, they acted within what is generally considered the purview of political
leaders.
But in forcing Naveh and Tamari out of the IDF, Chief of General Staff Lt.
Gen. Dan Halutz and his deputy Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky sent the message
that independent thinkers are unwelcome in their IDF. The political-strategic
trend initiated by Sharon has brought about a state of affairs where Israel's
decision-making echelon is bereft of all voices opposing Israeli retreats.
By eviscerating OTRI, Halutz and Kaplinsky have added an operational component
within the IDF to this larger political-strategic trend. They have set the
course for purging the IDF of people who - while perhaps ideologically
sympathetic towards the unilateral retreat policies - are guilty of the sin
of thinking critically about military science.
What exactly did OTRI accomplish under Naveh and Tamari's stewardship? On
Wednesday, Yaalon, who began his association with OTRI as Commander of Central
Command in the late 1990s, summarized the institute's activities as follows:
"OTRI contributed both to Central Command and to the General Staff. Its
contribution to the General Staff involved the development of a new operational
concept whose development was necessitated by the evolution of the threats
[that Israel faces]. OTRI, in conjunction with commanders in the field worked
on developing cognitive tools and doctrines on a trial and error basis. The
method of operational assessment that is used today in the regional commands
and in the General Staff was developed through the joint work of OTRI with
field commanders."
Over the past few years, foreign militaries began noticing that something
new was happening in the IDF. As Yaalon explains, "The Americans saw there
were a lot of changes in our assessment methods, and they asked us to transfer
our new knowledge to them. OTRI worked with the Americans to teach them the
methods we had developed."
Lt. Col. David Pere, from the US Marine Corps, is now involved in authoring
the Marine Corps' operational doctrine. He characterizes OTRI's contribution
to the US Armed Forces thus: "Naveh and OTRI's influence on the intellectual
discourse and understanding of the operational level of war in the US has
been immense. The US Marine Corps has commissioned a study of design that
will result in a Marine Corps Concept of Design that is based heavily on
Shimon [Naveh]'s [work]. One can hardly attend a military conference in the
US without a discussion of Shimon or [OTRI's] System of Operational Design..The
Army's doctrinal publication on Operations (Field Manual 3.0), will include
design based on SOD in its next edition." Like the Americans, the British,
Australians and other armed forces are integrating the concepts developed
over the past decade by IDF commanders and OTRI researchers into their formal
doctrines. OF COURSE, in spite of all of this, if OTRI personnel were involved
in corrupt practices, then Halutz and Kaplinsky would be wrong not to take
action.
But they were not involved in corrupt practices. The decision to suspend
Naveh and Tamari and two additional OTRI researchers last week came in the
wake of a draft report by the State Comptroller on the IDF's training of
its senior officer corps. The draft report was submitted to the IDF for review
last month. The report's preliminary findings determined that Naveh, Tamari
and two other OTRI researchers had not followed all the proper procedures
for billing their hours. The report did not allege that the researchers did
not work or that they somehow absconded with tax payers' money.
Yediot's report noted that the State Comptroller's draft report found problems
with the management norms of both OTRI and the National Security College
and that these problems led Halutz and Kaplinsky to transfer the report to
the Military Advocate General. Here is the place to note that the relative
weight Yediot gave to the two reports was misplaced. Equally curious is the
fact that in responding to Yediot's inquiry, the IDF Spokesman's Unit limited
its statement to allegations against OTRI and ignored completely the charges
raised against the National Security College. There is much that could be
added to these general observations. Unfortunately adding to what was already
reported in Yediot on Tuesday is illegal.
And that is the heart of the matter. The State Comptroller's Law states
explicitly that no one may make use of the materials prepared by the State
Comptroller. According to paragraph 28 of the Law, Yediot was legally barred
from publishing the contents of the draft report. Furthermore, paragraph
30 of the Law stipulates: "Reports, opinions and any other document promulgated
or prepared by the Comptroller in carrying out his duties may not be used
in any legal or disciplinary procedure." In light of this, the disciplinary
procedure which Halutz set in motion against OTRI's researchers which led
to Naveh, Tamari and two other researchers' suspensions and precipitated
both Naveh and Tamari's resignations was illegal.
A number of theories are making the rounds attempting to explain why Halutz
and Kaplinsky decided to purge OTRI of its leadership. Some say that Halutz
and Kaplinsky oppose the whole concept of operational design. But this view
does not pass the reality test. The General Staff's Operational Concept for
the IDF is rooted in OTRI's theoretical doctrine of systemic operational
design. Indeed, it is a complete vindication of OTRI's research.
Others say that Kaplinsky and Halutz cannot abide by Tamari and Naveh because
they represent Yaalon's intellectual legacy in the IDF. According to this
reasoning, while Kaplinsky and Halutz accept in whole OTRI's conceptual framework
and so embrace Yaalon's legacy, they wish to co-opt this legacy and believe
they can only do so by throwing Naveh and Tamari out of the army.
Whatever the proximate cause of their banishment from the IDF, the effect
of their departure will, in Pere's view, "endanger the IDF." There are two
reasons for this. First, any replacement that Halutz and Kaplinsky appoint
to succeed Naveh will be unable to carry forward his work. Naveh, like
Clausewitz, is a path breaker. He has many disciples, but no substitutes.
Second, and more generally, in forcing Naveh and Tamari's departure, Halutz
and Kaplinsky are sending a devastating message to the IDFs senior officer
corps. By precipitating the departure of the IDF's most prominent intellectuals,
Halutz and Kaplinsky are signaling those senior officers that their career
advancement is dependent on their willingness to think what they are told
to think.
From a national perspective, the significance of the decision to decimate
OTRI is similarly bleak. To all intents and purposes, since 1973, Israel
has suffered from a nearly continuous breakdown in strategic thinking that
has produced an unremitting string of national failures from Oslo, through
the withdrawal from Lebanon to the withdrawal from Gaza. Indeed, Israel's
continued survival in the face of these strategic blunders is the product
of the IDF's ability to compensate for the political leadership's incompetence
by producing operational and tactical successes. Woe to Israel if our strategic
idiocy spreads to these areas as well. |